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Abstract
This paper shows that lending relationships insulate corporate investment from
shocks to collateral values. We construct a novel database covering the banking rela-
tionships of UK firms, as well as those of their board members and executives. We find
that the sensitivity of corporate investment to shocks to real estate collateral value is
halved when the length of the bank-firm relationship increases from the 25th to the
75th percentile. This effect is substantially reduced for firms whose executives have a
personal mortgage relationship with their firm’s bank. Our findings provide support for
theories where collateral and private information are substitutes in mitigating credit
frictions over the cycle.
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1 Introduction
Swings in collateral prices can generate booms and busts in corporate investment (Gan,
2007; Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar, 2012). This collateral channel is consistent with theories
where collateral mitigates contracting frictions and thus increases firms’ borrowing capacity
in a procyclical way (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997).
However, collateral is only one of several potential determinants of credit frictions over
the cycle. An extensive corporate finance literature shows that agency problems can be mit-
igated by intense firm-bank lending relationships. And influential macroeconomic theories
stress that credit cycles arise from the interaction between fluctuations in collateral values
and information issues (Gertler, 1992; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997).
This paper seeks to reconcile these literatures. Our key question is: do strong lending
relationships between banks and corporates and their executives amplify or moderate the
link between collateral and investment?
In addition to informing policies aiming to curb credit cycles, this question is motivated
by conflicting theoretical clues. Strong lending relationships could mitigate the collateral
channel if relationships act as a substitute for collateral - for instance because they both
help to overcome informational asymmetries in lending contracts (Boot, 2000). But strong
relationships could accelerate the collateral channel if relationships and collateral are com-
plements - for instance if private information helps lenders to monitor collateral (Rajan and
Winton, 1995) or extract rents from borrowers (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992).
Our results provide clear support for the first hypothesis: the longer lending relation-
ships between banks and both corporates and their executives, the slower the ”accelerator”
whereby shocks to the value of corporate collateral affect corporate investment dynamics.
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We use a panel dataset of UK firms covering the 2002-2013 period. The data and set-
up have two unique features. First, the panel covers the entire universe of UK companies,
whereas datasets available for other countries typically focus on either SMEs or publicly
listed firms. This allows us to test whether the importance of lending relationships and
collateral varies across firm types and size, as predicted by theory. This is particularly useful
in the UK context, where both bank-based and market-based corporate finance are highly
developed. Second, the data reports information on the banking relationships of the firm
and the personal mortgage relationships of each of its individual directors. This allows us
to explore the importance of both types of relationships. The UK is a particularly rich lab-
oratory in this context, with around 40% of UK SMEs reporting debt secured by residential
real estate - that is, the own houses of their director(s).
Our main test investigates how lending relationship intensity affects the response of corpo-
rate investment to shocks to the value of real estate collateral. To mitigate the endogeneity
of collateral holdings, we follow Benmelech and Bergman (2009) and Chaney, Sraer, and
Thesmar (2012) and use a proxy which interacts (i) the initial value of corporate collateral
at the start of the sample, and (ii) plausibly exogenous yearly changes in regional land prices
across 204 local authorities in England, Scotland, and Wales. We then interact this proxy
with a measure of relationship intensity to test the conflicting hypotheses outlined above.
The granularity of our data allows us to address a number of related empirical challenges
with fixed effects. Because initial collateral holdings might be correlated with unobserved
firm characteristics, our baseline specification includes firm fixed effects. Real estate price
shocks could also affect corporate investment through demand-side channels, such as local
investment opportunities (Giroud and Mueller, 2016) or agglomeration effects (Dougal, Par-
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sons, and Titman, 2015). We mitigate these channels by including region-year fixed effects
in our regressions. In contrast to several existing studies of the collateral channel, we observe
the identity of both firms and their lenders. Therefore, we can additionally include bank-year
fixed effects; this allows us to control for the possible impact of real estate prices on corpo-
rate investment though its effect on banks’ lending capacity (Gan, 2007; Flannery and Lin,
2016). Because unobserved determinants of both collateral and relationship decisions and
investment dynamics could still bias our results, we instrument for local real estate prices
using the geography-based instrument of Saiz (2010) adapted for the UK as a robustness
check.
Our key results are the following. Consistent with Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012),
we find that increasing collateral values are associated with higher corporate investment: a
£1 increase in the value of corporate collateral increases investment by around £0.04. But
we find that this effect is significantly reduced for firms with longer banking relationships. A
firm with a 75th percentile relationship length (15.4 years) increases investment by around
50% less than a firm with a 25th percentile relationship length (4.2 years) when collateral
values increase. Overall, this finding is consistent with the notion that lending relationships
dampen the effect of collateral value on borrowing constraints, as predicted by models where
collateral and private information are substitutes (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Boot, 2000).
This interpretation raises a number of further identification issues. First, relationship
length and collateral holding decisions might be correlated with confounding determinants
of corporate investment, such as firm size (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Adelino, Schoar, and
Severino, 2015), age (Siemer, 2014) or credit score (Boot, Thakor, and Udell, 1991). We
show that introducing additional controls for these factors and their interaction with collat-
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eral value does not change our results. Second, relationship length and collateral usage could
also be affected by bank characteristics (Schwert, 2018); however, we find that controlling
for lender size or financial strength does not affect our conclusions. Finally, our key result
remains similar when we consider manuacturing firms only; this eliminates firms in the non-
tradable and real estate sectors, whose demand might be more affected by local economic
conditions and asset prices. Because manufacturing firms are likely to export their products
out of their home region, this result provides further comfort that our results are not driven
by demand-side effects (Adelino, Schoar, and Severino, 2015).
We document several results providing additional support for our interpretation of the
results. First, we run the baseline regression using short-term and long-term corporate bor-
rowing as the dependent variable. Consistent with theory emphasising frictions in long-term
debt contracts, we find that lending relationships only mitigate the response of long-term
borrowing to changes in collateral value. Second, we show that lending relationships only
significantly mitigate the collateral channel for private firms. This is consistent with the
notion that publicly listed firms circumvent bank lending and collateral constraints by bor-
rowing from capital markets or face smaller informational constraints.
The last part of the paper investigates whether personal lending relationships between
banks and company executives affect corporate investment above and beyond corporate
lending relationships. Our dataset has two unique features compared to the existing stud-
ies (Karolyi, 2018). First, we observe the identity of both executives and shareholders of
all UK private and public firms. Second, we have information on the personal mortgage
relationship of these individuals. Our results suggest that corporate relationships insulate
investment from collateral value shocks to a lesser extent for firms whose directors also have
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personal relationships with the same bank; in other words, personal lending relationships
act as a substitute for corporate relationships.
Contributions To our knowledge, our paper is the first to show that banking relationships
mitigate the impact of collateral values on corporate investment.
The link between swings in collateral values and corporate investment is well established;1
but the role of lending relationships within these dynamics remains unexplored. Conversely,
lending relationships are known to support lending during downturns;2 but it is less clear
whether this affects real outcomes, and what role collateral plays in this context. Several
microeconomic studies emphasise the link between collateral and lending relationships, but
not its effect on corporate investment dynamics.3
Our findings add to evidence that cyclical fluctuations in house prices have more pow-
erful effects on the activity of small and/or young firms.4 We share with these papers the
notion that collateral constraints are more binding for firms subject to otherwise more se-
vere financial frictions. But we show that these frictions are mitigated by long-term lending
relationships, and that this mechanism is distinct from a size or age effect.
Finally, our paper adds to a nascent literature on lending relationships between banks
and individuals within firms. Karolyi (2018) finds that relationships between executives
and banks mitigate the impact of recessions on corporate investment. Our data allow us
1Gan (2007); Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012); Cvijanovic (2014); Kleiner (2015); Ersahin and Irani
(2015); Bahaj, Foulis, and Pinter (2016).
2Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro, and Saurina (2012); Sette and Gobbi (2015); DeYoung, Gron, Torna, and
Winton (2015); Bolton, Freixas, and Gambacorta (2016); Banerjee, Gambacorta, and Sette (2017); Beck,
Degryse, De Haas, and Van Horen (2018).
3Jimenez, Salas, and Saurina (2006); Berger, Frame, and Ioannidou (2011). The findings of this liter-
ature are inconclusive. For instance, Berger and Udell (1995) find that firms with long relationships post
less collateral, while Ono and Uesugi (2009) and Cerqueiro, Ongena, and Roszbach (2016) find that bank
monitoring increases with corporate collateral usage and value.
4Fort, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2013); Siemer (2014); Adelino, Schoar, and Severino (2015);
Banerjee and Blickle (2016).
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to not only observe the identity of company executives and shareholders, but also their pri-
vate mortgage relationships. Our findings suggest that these relationships affect corporate
investment dynamics in both good and bad times.
2 Testable Hypotheses and Empirical Strategy
Financial intermediation theory offers two conflicting predictions about the role of banking
relationships for the collateral channel.5
A first strand of theories suggests that relationships and collateral play a similar role
in overcoming adverse selection and moral hazard issues in debt contracts. Relationships
mitigate the adverse selection problem to the extent that they provide lenders with private
information about a borrower’s default risk (Boot, 2000); relationships also reduce moral
hazard by reducing monitoring costs after a loan is granted. Similarily, collateral helps
lenders to screen otherwise similar prospective borrowers ex ante (Bester, 1985; Besanko and
Thakor, 1987), and monitor borrowers ex post (Boot, Thakor, and Udell, 1991).
If they are a substitute for collateral, stronger banking relationships might dampen the
link between firm collateral and firm investment. For example, lenders can require less (more)
collateral from firms they are able to monitor more (less) intensively (Holmstrom and Tirole,
1997; Manove, Padilla, and Pagano, 2001). Alternatively, lenders might be willing to abstract
from crisis-time drops in the collateral value of firms with which they have ongoing, profitable
relationships (Sette and Gobbi, 2015; Bolton, Freixas, and Gambacorta, 2016; Jiangli, Unal,
5Collateral and banking relationships can affect corporate investment under three conditions. Firstly,
firms’ cash inflows should be imperfectly correlated with their investment opportunities, thereby giving the
firm a reason to seek external finance (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993). Secondly, the firm should face
frictions in accessing external finance. Thirdly, collateral and/or banking relationships should act to reduce
these frictions (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997).
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and Yom, 2008). In return for this bad-time ”insurance” lenders may be less willing to extend
more credit when collateral values rise during booms. Summing up:
Hypothesis 1 If collateral and lending relationships are substitutes, longer relationships
should dampen the link between collateral and investment.
Another hypothesis is that collateral and banking relationships are complements, in which
case stronger relationships could amplify the link between collateral and investment. For in-
stance, collateral could increase lenders’ incentive to monitor borrowers (Rajan and Winton,
1995), or lower the cost of doing so. Alternatively, collateral might help reducing lenders’
inclination to extract rents from (”hold up”) firms with which they have long-standing rela-
tionships (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992; Xu, Wang, and Rixtel, 2015). Summing up:
Hypothesis 2 If collateral and banking relationships are complements, longer relationships
should amplify the link between collateral and investment.
2.1 Empirical Specification
Given these conflicting theories, this paper tests how lending relationships affect the response
of corporate investment to shocks to real-estate collateral values. The baseline empirical
specification is:
Investmenti,t = αi + δj,t + µk,t + φ · FirmControlsi,t
+β · Collaterali,t + κ ·RelationshipLengthi,t
+δ · Collaterali,t ×RelationshipLengthi,t + εi,t (2.1)
where:
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Investmenti,t is a proxy for the investment activity by firm i, located in region
j and with relationships with a combination of banks indexed by
k at time t
αi is a firm fixed effect
δj,t is a region-time fixed effect
µk,t is a bank combination-time fixed effect
FirmControlsi,t are various controls for firm i
Collaterali,t measures the value of corporate collateral
RelationshipLengthi,t measures the average length of relationship between firm i and its
banks
In Equation 2.1, the coefficient β measures the direct strength of the corporate collateral
channel. The coefficient of interest is δ, which measures the impact of RelationshipLength
on the collateral channel. A negative δ would imply that the collateral channel is weaker for
firms which have longer relationships with their banks.
Following Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012), we identify the causal effect of the collat-
eral channel by combining two sources of variation in real estate collateral values. Within
regions, the collateral channel is identified by exploiting differences in the initial holdings
of collateral. Across regions, we exploit differences in the evolution of real estate prices, as
described in detail below.
The fixed effects included in Equation 2.1 address three distinct identification channels.
Firm fixed effects (αi) capture unobserved, time-invariant characteristics that could deter-
mine collateral and relationship decisions and investment dynamics; region-time fixed effects
(δj,t) control for unobserved region-specific macroeconomic conditions which could affect
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corporate investment through demand-side channels; finally, bank-combination-time fixed
effects (µk,t) control for the potential impact of real estate prices on banks’ balance sheets
and credit supply capacity (Gan, 2007).6 Our choice of firm-level controls is guided by ex-
isting literature, where our data permits it. Following the firm investment literature, (e.g.
Hubbard (1998)), we include measures of cash flow as controls. In particular, we include
firms’ profit margin and cash ratio. We also include other correlates of collateral as controls,
in particular firm age (Rajan, 1992; Bolton and Freixas, 2000) and credit score (Berger and
Udell, 1995; Brick and Palia, 2007).
3 Data, Sample, and Summary Statistics
3.1 Data Sources
Corporates Our main source of information on UK companies is the Financial Analysis
Made Easy (FAME) dataset, provided by Bureau Van Dijk. FAME reports financial data for
all incorporated UK companies registered at Companies House; the dataset does not cover
partnerships or sole proprietorships.
FAME reports data on bank-firm relationships, corporate collateral, corporate activity
and corporate financing, directors’ identities and addresses, as well as the postcode of each
firm’s trading addresses, date of incorporation, and industrial sector (4 digit SIC code). This
allows us to identify the region(s) and sector within which a firm operates.
One limitation of FAME is that the reporting requirements differ by company size; only
6Fixed effects are based on the combination of banks a firm has a relationship with. For example, a firm
which banks with “Bank A” and “Bank B” will have the same bank combination fixed effect as another firm
which banks with “Bank A” and “Bank B”. The fixed effect will differ from that of one bank firms which
bank with just “Bank A” or just “Bank B” and from multibank firms which bank with, for example, “Bank
A” and “Bank C”.
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large companies are required to report full balance sheet and profit and loss accounts (Evans
and Ritchie, 2009). Furthermore, FAME is a live database; information on key variables such
as company structure and director information is thus only accurate at the time the database
is accessed. To mitigate this issue, we have used discs of the FAME database over time and
have archived the database at six-monthly intervals over the January 2005 to August 2015
period to capture information when it is first reported. Using this database, we can start
our panel in 2002.
Banks We retrieve accounting data for banks from the Bank of England’s Historical Bank-
ing Regulatory Database (HBRD). The HBRD reports financial statements and confidential
regulatory information for all authorized UK banks and building societies, both at the con-
solidated (group) level and the standalone (bank) level.
Real Estate Prices To proxy for collateral values, we use monthly regional repeat-sales
house price data for 204 regions in England, Wales and Scotland since 1995 as reported in
the Land Registry Price Paid dataset. We match this data to individual companies using the
registered office postcode reported in FAME. The variation in the evolution of real estate
prices across over our sample horizon (2002-2013) is substantial; it varies between -43%
(Kingston upon Hull) and 288% (Aberdeenshire).
3.2 Variables Measurement
Corporate Collateral FAME reports the value of a firm’s ”Land and Buildings”. We
do not use this item as our preferred measure of collateral values given because firms en-
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dogenously choose the quantity of collateral they hold.7 Instead, we follow Benmelech and
Bergman (2009), Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012) and Bahaj, Foulis, and Pinter (2016)
and exploit fluctuations in collateral prices only. In essence, we measure the value of a firm’s
land and buildings at the start of the sample, and iterate it forward as a function of changes







where LandHoldingsi,2002 is the book value of land and buildings owned by the firm at the
start of the sample (2002), and LandPricesj,t is the real estate price index for the region
where a firm has its registered office. We scale our measure of Collateral using the Turnover
of the firm in the previous year.8 We select 2002 as our base year to preserve a sufficient
number of observations.9





We compute the following controls. First, we compute firms’ CashRatio (Bank Deposits-
Overdrafts) and ProfitMargin (Operating Profit), both scaled by lagged turnover. To
7This could either be because the firm has invested in land in anticipation of future growth, or because
investment decisions are serially correlated (for example, a firm that buys a new building one year, may be
much less likely to buy a new building in the following year).
8Alternatively, we could have used fixed assets as the scaling variable, which would be closer to the
approach of Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012) which uses property plant and equipment as the scaling
variable. However, unlike their dataset, ours is not limited to listed and relatively large companies, but
includes a large number of small companies with potentially small amounts of fixed assets. The choice of
turnover as a scaling variable is therefore better suited to our sample, and avoids placing too much weight
on smaller companies with small holdings of fixed assets.
9This assumption is restrictive in that it requires firms to have existed since 2002; it is similar to the
requirement of Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012) which looks at Compustat firms in existence since 1993.
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avoid extreme outliers, the three variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile.
FirmAge is measured as the logarithm of one plus the number of months since the firm was
incorporated. We measure a firm’s Credit Score in a given year using the “Quiscore” which
is reported in the FAME dataset. The Quiscore is produced by CRIF Decision Solutions
Limited and is designed to reflect the likelihood that the company will fail in the following
12 months. Each firm is assigned a value between 0 and 100, with a larger value indicating
a lower probability of failure.10
Banking Relationships UK companies are required to report charges and mortgages
(hereafter ”charges”) to Companies House within 21 days of their creation date. We use
this information to identify bank-firm relationships. We use a textual algorithm to match
registered charges to UK banks and building societies. The dataset reports the charge
creation date and whether the charge is outstanding. For firms which have an outstanding
charge with a bank, we use the charge creation date to proxy for the length of a given
bank-firm relationship as follows:
RelationshipLengthi,b,t = log (1 +Monthsi,b,t), (3.2)
whereMonthsi,b,t is the number of months at time t since a charge was first created between
firm i and bank b.11 For firms with outstanding bank charges with more than one bank at
10The scores can be categorised into 5 bands: 0-20 “high risk”, 21-40 “caution”, 41-60 “normal”, 61-80
“stable” and 81-100 “secure”. The Quiscore is produced using a proprietary model which considers a range of
factors including the financial performance of the firm, the economic conditions the firm faces and the firm’s
compliance with audit procedures (see, for example, Bo, Lensink, and Murinde (2008) for more details).
11It is important to note that the archiving of FAME discs at a six-monthly frequency does not affect the
accuracy of our relationship length measure. Since firms must report the date on which charges are created,
we can accurately calculate the length of the relationship as the difference between the charge creation date
and the statement date of their accounts.
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a given point in time, we average RelationshipLength for all of the outstanding banking
relationships a firm has. We exclude firms which do not have any outstanding bank charges
from our analysis. The literature has used proxies for relationship intensity other than dura-
tion, such as the number of past interactions or their size (Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and
Srinivasan, 2009). The limitations of our data do not allow us to consider these alternatives.
Bank Controls In some specifications, we control for the following bank characteristics,
as measured at the banking group level: size (log total assets), net charge-offs and leverage
(Tier 1 capital to total assets).
3.3 Sample and Summary Statistics
Our sample includes all private and public UK companies which report to Companies House
between 2002 and 2013. Following Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012) and Kleiner (2015),
we exclude firms in the agriculture, utilities, construction, finance and insurance, real estate
and public administration sectors.12 To avoid double counting, we exclude companies that
have a parent with an ownership stake exceeding 50%. We further drop firms without any
outstanding banking relationships, or which do not report fixed assets, depreciation, collat-
eral, operating profit and cash rate. Since reporting requirements differ across companies,
this screening reduces the size of our sample. Table 1 reports the proportion of firms in
FAME for our selected industries which report banking relationships and the balance sheet
and profit and loss items above. Around 15% of firms report a banking relationship. While
Total Assets and Fixed Assets are relatively well reported (96% and 85% of observations
12The UK 2003 Standard Industrial Classification [SIC] codes we exclude are: mining (1010-1450), utilities
(4011-4100), construction (4511-4550), finance and insurance (6511-6720), real estate (7011-7032), and public
administration (7511-7530).
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respectively), Land and Buildings and Turnover are reported less frequently (59% and 18%
of observations). The final sample has 115,284 firm-year observations covering 27,572 firms.
As shown in Table 1, the firms in our selected sample tend to be larger, employ more
workers and have greater turnover than the average firm in the full FAME dataset. Still,
the representative firm in the sample is fairly small, with a median turnover around £1.6
million. The average turnover is substantially higher, reflecting a small number of very large
firms. The median value for collateral as a percentage of firm turnover is around 2%.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for our sample, categorised by the number of banking
relationships firms have. Almost 90% of the observations have outstanding charges with
just one bank (henceforth ”single-bank firms”). Just over 10% of the observations have out-
standing charges with more than one bank (”multiple-bank firms”), a large majority of which
have two relationships. The median banking relationship for single-bank firms is around 8.8
years in length, against 8.2 years for multiple-bank firms. The UK banking system is highly
concentrated; as a result, four banking groups account for around 90% of single-bank firm
observations.
Our sample is representative of the UK economy despite these screenings. Table 4 shows
the distribution of employment in our sample across our selected industries, using the UK
2003 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). We compare the distribution of employment
with the distribution in the overall FAME dataset (which does not condition on firms re-
porting the variables described above) and also the aggregate employment distribution using
“Workforce jobs” data from the Office for National Statistics. The distribution of employ-
ment across industries in our selected sample is similar to that of the overall FAME dataset.
Relative to the aggregate data, the share of employment in education and health and so-
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cial care is very small in our sample, since we focus on employment within UK companies.
The share of employment in manufacturing is notably higher in our sample relative to the
aggregate data.
4 Collateral Channel and Corporate Relationships
4.1 Baseline Results
Corporate Collateral Channel We begin by assessing the strength of the direct collat-
eral channel, measured by the coefficient β in equation 2.1. Column 1 of Table 5 reports
the results of a regression of corporate investment against collateral and our preffered set of
fixed effects only. The results suggest that a £1 increase in the value of corporate collateral
increases investment by around £0.04. This finding is of a comparable magnitude to the evi-
dence presented by Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012), which suggests that US public firms
increase investment by around $0.06 in response to a $1 increase in the value of corporate
collateral.
In column 2, we add our preferred set of controls. In addition to the firm characteristics
listed in the table, the set of controls includes the interactions of quintiles of Firm Age, Profit
Margin and Total Assets (as measured in 2002) with the index of local real estate prices. We
do so following Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012) because this index is used to measure
Collateral, which creates a potential omitted variable problem for the identification of our
regressor of interest Collateral × RelationshipLength. These additional controls leave the
estimate of the direct collateral channel unchanged.
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Collateral Channel and Banking Relationships In column 3 of Table 5, we test our
preferred specification by including the interaction of Collateral with RelationshipLength.
For ease of comparison with columns 1 and 2, we measure RelationshipLength in deviation
from its sample average. Therefore the coefficient on firm collateral (β in Equation 2.1)
captures the magnitude of the collateral channel for a firm with RelationshipLength equal
to the sample mean.
The estimated coefficient on Collateral × RelationshipLength , reported in column 3,
suggests that longer banking relationships are associated with a significantly weaker collateral
channel. The strength of the collateral channel is weaker for firms which have longer banking
relationships. Specifically, the estimated coefficient suggests that a doubling in relationship
length reduces the strength of the collateral channel by around £0.02.13 To provide some
context to these results, a firm with an average relationship length equal to the 75th percentile
(15.4 years) increases investment by around 50% less than a firm in the 25th percentile (4.2
years) in response to a collateral shock of the same value.
Firm investment could be affected by house prices and the interaction of house prices
and relationship length regardless of whether firms own commercial property, for instance
through a demand channel. In column 4 of Table 5, we include the index of house prices and
its interaction with RelationshipLength as controls. Both the coefficient for the collateral
channel and its interaction with relationship length remain significant.
Private vs. Public Firms If banking relationships serve to overcome informational asym-
metries between banks and firms, the impact of banking relationship length on the collateral
channel should be reduced for firms which face less informational constraints. Publicly listed
13Recall that RelationshipLength is measured in natural logarithms, as described in Equation 3.2.
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firms are typically thought to be less affected by information frictions in banking relation-
ships. One reason is that these firms are required to disclose more information, which may
reduce the informational asymmetries associated with lending contracts. In addition, public
firms can more readily access market-based funding, and can thus circumvent frictions in
access to bank finance.
In columns 5-6 of Table 5, we report the results of running our baseline regression sep-
arately for private and public firms. Consistent with our prior, the results suggest that
the interaction between relationship and collateral is only statistically significant for private
firms.
Corporate Borrowing To explore the mechanism through which firm collateral and bank-
ing relationships impact on corporate investment, we re-estimate our baseline model using
short-term debt issuance and long-term debt issuance as the dependent variable. The re-
sults in columns 7 and 8 of Table 5 suggest that higher collateral values are associated with
increases in both short-term and long-term debt issuance. A £1 increase in corporate col-
lateral increases short-term corporate debt issuance by around £0.011 and long-term debt
issuance by around £0.012. By contrast, the interaction of collateral and relationship length
is associated with an increase in long-term debt (Column 7), but not in short-term debt
(Column 6).
Overall, the results suggest that longer banking relationships reduce the strength of the
collateral channel, and that this effect coincides with firms with longer relationships reducing
their long-term borrowing by less when collateral values decline. These findings support the
notion that collateral and private information act as substitutes in mitigating asymmetric
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information in long-term debt contracts.
4.2 Robustness
4.2.1 Additional Interactions
We now explore whether our key result is driven by time-varying firm or bank characteristics
which could be correlated with collateral holdings and relationship length, and might affect
corporate investment. To do so, we successively add a number of relevant controls to our
baseline regression, as well as their interaction with Collateral and RelationshipLength.
Table 6 reports the results; column 1 reproduces our baseline specification for ease of com-
parison.
First, collateral holdings and relationship length could be systematically linked to their
age and size. The results in columns 2 to 3 indicate that adding relevant proxies do not
affect our key conclusion. Second, riskier firms might also differ in their collateral usage and
the nature of their lending relationships. The results in column 4 suggest that controlling
for firms’ credit rating does not affect the main result either.
A second concern is that firms’ preferred relationship length might be related to the
characteristics of banks (Schwert, 2018). Different banks might also differ in their collateral
requirements. In columns 5 to 7, we thus add controls for the lender size, leverage, and non-
performing loans.14 None of these additional controls change our main result. Finally, as
the summary statistics presented in Table 2 show, firms with a single bank relationship tend
to differ from multiple-bank firms in several dimensions. In particular, single-bank firms are
14Following the approach taken to measure RelationshipLength for multiple-bank firms, we average
Bank Size, Bank Leverage and Bank Losses across all the banks a firm has relationships with in a given
year. We also demean all of the variables which we interact with Collateral.
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smaller, invest less and have less collateral on average. The results in column 8 show that
adding a dummy for multiple-bank firms does not affect our results either.
4.2.2 Instrumental Variable Approach
Our measure of real estate prices could be correlated with the unobserved error term, εi,t.
This may be the case if there is reverse causation, whereby investment by large companies in
a given region impacts on real estate prices in that region. A second reason why this may be
the case is that our measure of real estate prices may be correlated with omitted variables,
for example local demand shocks, which affect firm investment. The use of region-time
fixed effects (δj,t) in our baseline specification provides a first line of defense against biases
related to regional demand shocks associated with house price fluctuations. A complementary
strategy is to instrument real estate prices with a variable correlated with collateral values
but uncorrelated with the unobserved error term εi,t. Starting with Saiz (2010), the existing
literature has mostly used measures of housing supply elasticity as instruments for real estate
prices.
Arguably the problem of reverse causality is likely to be less severe for our sample, which
is dominated by relatively small firms, compared to studies focused on larger firms such as
Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012). To mitigate remaining concerns, we adapt the approach
of Saiz (2010) to our sample; specifically, we instrument for real estate prices in region j by
interacting a measure of mortgage demand - the interest rate on 2-year 75% LTV mortgages
as collected by the Bank of England - with a measure of geographic constraints on the supply
of housing in region j. We use a measure of local housing supply constraints constructed
by Hilber and Vermeulen (2016), which considers the share of developable land that was
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developed in 1990. For regions with a more inelastic supply of housing, a given shift in
demand should have a larger impact on real estate prices.
The first-stage regression for our instrumental variables approach is :
LandPricej,t = b0,j + b1t + b2 × elasticityj × it + j,t, (4.1)
where:
b0,j is a region fixed effect
b1,t is a time fixed effect, capturing macroeconomic fluctuations in real estate
prices
elasticityj measures the constraints on land supply in region j
it is the nationwide mortgage rate at a monthly frequency
j,t is an unobserved error term
We then use the predicted regional real estate price indices from Equation 4.1 to produce
our collateral measure, as described by Equation 3.1. Finally, we use this measure and its
interaction with Relationship Length to instrument for Collateral and Collateral × Relation-
ship Length, respectively.
The results are shown in column 2 of Table 7. For comparability, column 1 shows the
baseline OLS results. For the instrumental variables approach, the direct corporate collat-
eral channel is significant and larger in magnitude to our baseline results. The estimated
coefficient on the interaction of Collateral with RelationshipLength is also significant and
is slightly more negative than in the baseline results.
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4.2.3 Robustness Checks
We now perturb our baseline model in different ways; results are reported in Table 7. First,
our results could be biased by the requirement that firms are present in the sample in
2002, when we fix the value of LandHoldings. For robustness, we fix the market value of
LandHoldings at time t− 5 and compute the value of collateral by iterating forward using
changes in the regional real estate prices between time t − 5 and t. The value of collateral
for firm i in region j at time t is therefore given by:
Collaterali,t = LandHoldingsi,t−5 × LandPricej,tLandPricej,t−5 × 1Turnoveri,t−1
The results, presented in column 3 of Table 7 show that the key results remain qualita-
tively unchanged.
Real Estate Price Index Our measure of collateral uses residential house prices to proxy
for commercial real estate prices. We do so because of the wide regional coverage of house
price data. One drawback is that commercial real estate prices might not correlate perfectly
with residential house prices. We therefore re-estimate Collateral using commercial real es-
tate prices from the Investment Property Databank. Commercial real estate price indices are
only available for major UK cities, whereas residential house prices are available at the local
authority level. As a result, our sample size using this approach is much lower. The results
in column 4 of Table 7, show that both the direct collateral channel and the interaction of
collateral with banking relationship length remain significant and of comparable magnitude.
Relationship Length Measure The decision by banks and firms to maintain relation-
ships may be endogenous to the firm’s investment environment. For example, banks may
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break relationships with firms which have poor investment opportunities; in turn, invest-
ment opportunities might be correlated with the firm’s collateral values. To mitigate this
concern, we lag RelationshipLength by two years. The results in column 5 of Table 7 are
qualitatively unchanged from the baseline specification.
Investment Measures Next, we explore alternative dependent variables. Column 6 uses
investment excluding depreciation and column 7 uses investment in tangibles. The results in-
dicate that the corporate collateral channel and the interaction of collateral and relationship
length are significant using both of these alternative measures of investment.
Geographical and Product Mix Our baseline measure of firm collateral uses the house
price index for the region where a firm has its registered office. However, some firms operate
across multiple regions. We are able to identify these firms using the ”Trading Addresses”
variable in the Bureau van Dijk dataset. The results, reported in Column 8 of Table 7, show
that the key results are unchanged when excluding multiple-region firms from the sample.
Our baseline sample excludes companies that have a parent with an ownership stake
exceeding 50%. This is to avoid counting subsidiaries twice. Albeit sensible for those groups
which only operate in the UK, this approach might fail to address problems related to multi-
national groups. The balance sheet of these groups will reflect both their domestic and
overseas operations and so changes in the value of collateral may not affect investment be-
haviour in the same way. Furthermore, looking at UK banking relationships may be less
relevant for these multinationals if they have many overseas banking relationships. We iden-
tify UK-only firms as those firms which have total Turnover equal to ”UK turnover” in the
Bureau van Dijk dataset. Since some firms do not report this variable, we are unable to
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identify all UK focused firms using this approach. The results reported in column 9 of Table
7 suggest that our key results are not changed when considering only those firms which we
identify as UK-focused.
Our baseline specification includes region-time fixed effects to control for local demand
effects. This approach would not suffice if firms’ response to local demand conditions is de-
termined by factors correlated simultaneously with their collateral holdings and relationship
length. As a robustness check, in column 10 of Table 7 we consider whether our results differ
when considering only firms which operate in the manufacturing sector. Since these firms are
likely to produce tradable goods, they are likely to be relatively insensitive to local demand
conditions (Adelino, Schoar, and Severino, 2015). The key results remain unchanged.
5 Collateral Channel and Personal Relationships
In line with previous literature (Petersen and Rajan, 1994), our focus thus far has been
on the length of the relationship between a firm and its bank. However, personal relation-
ships between financial intermediaries and corporate executives might also help to mitigate
corporate borrowing constraints. This can be for three main reasons. Private information
about company executives can improve the lender’s ability to assess a firm’s creditworthiness
(Karolyi, 2018); company owners offer personal guarantees on their firm’s debt by pledging
their own houses - particularly for SME loans (Avery, Bostic, and Samolyk, 1998; Voordeck-
ers and Steijvers, 2006; Ono and Uesugi, 2009); finally, owners can re-mortgage their own
house and inject equity into their firms.
These clues are relevant to our study for two reasons. First, personal relationships could
23
act as a substitute for corporate relationships, and personal (outside) collateral could con-
stitute a substitute for corporate (inside) collateral.15 Controlling for both corporate and
personal relationships thus matters for identification to the extent that they might be corre-
lated empirically. Second, personal guarantees are particularly prevalent among UK firms,
with around 40% of SME loans secured by residential real estate (Bahaj, Foulis, and Pinter,
2016). As a result, UK firms’ investments are strongly responsive to fluctuations in the value
of their directors’ house prices.
Our dataset has two key features in this context. First, FAME reports the identity of
a given firm’s director(s) - that is, the individual(s) who have a statutory obligation to run
and contribute to the success of the company. Second, we can use the directors’ residential
address reported in FAME to identify the potential holder of the mortgage on the director’s
house, as reported in the Financial Conduct Authority’s Product Sales Database.16
We thus now consider whether bank-firm relationships insulate corporate investment from
collateral value shocks to a larger extent for firms whose directors do not have a personal
mortgage relationship with the firm’s bank. We create a dummy Director R’ship - 1 for firms
with common bank-firm and bank-director relationships, and 0 otherwise. Our main interest
is in the interaction between this dummy and our key regressor Collateral × Relationship
Length. This coefficient would be positive if director-bank relationships give banks infor-
mation on the company’s executives and/or a personal guarantee on the own house of the
director that act as a substitute for the bank-firm relationship. Conversely, the coefficient
15In theory, personal collateral could even be more credible than inside collateral since the owner’s personal
wealth is at stake (Voordeckers and Steijvers (2006) and references therein).
16See Bahaj, Foulis, and Pinter (2016) for a detailed explanation of the matching process. The FCA
Product Sales Data include regulated mortgage contracts only, and therefore exclude other regulated home
finance products such as home purchase plans and home reversions, and unregulated products such as second
charge lending and buy-to-let mortgages.
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would be negative if the director-bank relationship allows the bank to make a better use of
the bank-firm relationship.
The results, reported in column 2 of Table 8, are consistent with the first conjecture.
The estimates show that the interaction between Collateral and DirectorRelationship is
not statistically significant. In other words, the direct collateral channel is not materially
different for firms with or without a common firm-director banking relationships.
In contrast, the interaction of Collateral×RelationshipLength andDirectorRelationship
is positive and statistically significant. This suggests that our key mechanism whereby cor-
porate lending relationships insulate investment from fluctuations in collateral values is sub-
stantially weaker for firms whose directors also maintain personal relationships with their
firm’s banks. In other words, corporate relationships only act as a substitute for collateral
for firms in which there is no common firm-director banking relationship. The bottom line
is that personal relationships seem to be a substitute for corporate relationships.
Our data do not allow us to ascertain whether these results reflect corporate directors
pledging their own house as collateral or the firm’s bank gaining private information about di-
rectors through its mortgage relationship. However, our data provide information on whether
a given director is also a shareholder in the firm. Non-shareholder directors - most likely
high-level company executives - cannot pledge their own house as guarantee for the firm
borrowing.
In column 5 of Table 8 we thus introduce an additional dummy variable Shareholder -
one if the common director-bank relationship is that of a shareholder of the firm, and 0 oth-
erwise. First, the results show that the interaction between Shareholder and Collateral ×
RelationshipLength × DirectorRelationship is not statistically significant. This suggests
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that the substitutability between personal and corporate relationships in insulating corporate
investment from real-estate value shocks is not different across the two types of directors.
Second, the coefficient for Collateral×RelationshipLength×DirectorRelationship remains
positive and statistically significant. This term captures the substitutability between per-
sonal and corporate relationships in insulating corporate investment from real-estate value
shocks for firms whose common personal relationships are those of non-shareholder directors.
Taken at face value, the finding that this effect is significant suggests that the presence of a
common relationship may reduce the importance of banking relationship length by reducing
informational asymmetries about the management of the firm, rather than by shareholders
additionally pledging their own houses to secure their firm’s debt.
6 Conclusion
This paper shows that the collateral channel diminishes in strength when firms and their
executives maintain long-term relationships with a bank. Concretely, UK firms’ investment
is less responsive to changes in the value of their real estate collateral when their ongoing
lending relationships are longer. This finding is consistent with seminal theories arguing
that collateral and private information are two complementary ways to mitigate similar con-
tracting frictions (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997); it contradicts alternative models presenting
collateral and private information as complements (Rajan, 1992).
The notion of self-reinforcing swings in asset prices and economic activity has led to calls
for macroprudential policies aimed at curbing cycles in real estate prices, such as loan-to-
value limits and counter-cyclical buffers. Our results suggest that the transmission of these
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interventions to corporate investment is likely to depend on the intensity of firms’ lending
relationships. Understanding how the nature of corporate borrowing might evolve in a con-
text of sweeping technological and structural changes in banking and financial markets could
help inform policies aimed at taming future credit cycles.
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A Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics- Fame Dataset and Selected Sample









Total Assets (£000s) 96% 51 6% 1004
Fixed Assets (£000s) 85% 8 7% 284
Tangible Assets (£000s) 84% 6 9% 224
Land and Buildings (£000s) 59% 0 12% 55
Turnover (£000s) 18% 100 11% 1574
Number of Employees 5% 22 11% 73
Banking Relationship 19% 5%
Total Firm Year Observations 11194476 115284
Notes: The statistics are calculated for the “FAME Dataset” using all observations for active firms in
our selected industries which report at an annual frequency and our “Selected Sample” using observations
used for our baseline regression, covering the period 2002-2013. Our “Selected Sample” excludes firms that
have an ownership stake greater than 50%, that operate in certain industries, and that do not report the
main variables of interest for our baseline regression. Full details on our “Selected Sample” for the baseline
regression are given in Section 3.3. Column 1 gives the percentage of observations in the “FAME Dataset”
which report the given variables. Column 2 gives the median value of the given variables in the “FAME
Dataset”. Column 3 shows the coverage of the variables of interest, by value, of our “Selected Sample” and
Column 4 gives the median value of the given variables in our “Selected Sample”.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Selected Sample, Categorised by Number
of Banking Relationships
One Multiple All
Firm-year observations 101649 13635 115284
Turnover (£000s, median) 1400 3571 1574
Investment (median) .0086 .012 .009
Profit rate (median) .032 .028 .032
Collateral (median) .011 .084 .018
Short term debt (£000s, median) 89 232 100
Long term debt (£000s, median) 151 376 175
Age (months, median) 196 249 204
Relationship length (months, median) 106 98 104
Notes: This Table reports corporate activity and banking relationship data for firms in our “Selected
Sample”, sourced from the FAME Dataset. The sample period is 2002-2013 and covers firms with a banking
relationship. Columns 1 and 2 report summary statistics for firms which have outstanding charges with one
bank and outstanding charges with multiple banks respectively. Column 3 reports summary statistics for
the full sample. Investment is the change in “Fixed Assets” plus “Depreciation, scaled by lagged turnover.
Profit rate is defined as “Operating Profit”, scaled by lagged turnover. Collateral is defined by Equation
3.1. Short Term Debt is defined as the sum of the change in “Short Term Loans and Overdrafts”, scaled by
lagged turnover.
Table 3: Banking Groups of One Bank Firms
Number of relationships Observations Percentage
Banking Group 1 33451 32.9
Banking Group 2 23148 22.8
Banking Group 3 20394 20.1
Banking Group 4 14259 14.0
Banking Group 5 4446 4.4
Other 5951 5.9
Total 101649 100.0
The Table shows the banking groups which firms have relationships with for firms which have outstanding
charges with just one bank. The banking groups are anonymised and are ordered in descending order such
that Banking Group 1 is the Banking Group with the most firm-bank relationships. “Other” represents firms
which have banking relationships with banking groups other than the five largest banking groups.
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Sample 3% 33% 22% 7% 31% 0% 2% 3% 0% 1373160
FAME 2% 36% 23% 10% 26% 0% 1% 3% 0% 8000945
ONS 1% 14% 20% 8% 27% 10% 13% 7% 1% 25098000
2008
Sample 1% 26% 24% 6% 37% 0% 3% 3% 0% 1343630
FAME 1% 28% 24% 8% 33% 0% 2% 3% 0% 8880385
ONS 1% 11% 19% 8% 29% 10% 14% 7% 1% 26193750
2013
Sample 1% 22% 28% 8% 32% 0% 4% 3% 0% 899776
FAME 1% 24% 22% 10% 37% 0% 2% 4% 0% 9584456
ONS 1% 10% 18% 8% 30% 11% 15% 7% 0% 26751500
The Table shows the distribution in total employment across the industries included in our “Selected Sample”, the “FAME Dataset” and for the aggregate economy
using “Workforce Jobs” data sourced from the ONS. The final column shows the total number of employees covered by the relevant samples. The industrial
groupings are based on UK 2003 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. We exclude firms operating in utilities (2003-SIC: 4011-4100), construction
(2003-SIC: 4511-4550), finance and insurance (2003-SIC: 6511-6720), real estate (2003-SIC: 7011-7032), public administration (2003-SIC: 7511-7530), and mining
(2003-SIC: 1010-1450).
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Table 5: Corporate Relationships & the Collateral Channel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)




Included Firms: All Private Public All
Collateral 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.05** 0.01*** 0.01**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.02) (0.002) (0.005)
Cash Ratio 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.11** 0.16*** -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)
Profit Margin -0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.01 0.05 0.02 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
Firm Age -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01* 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.02)
Credit Rating -0.00 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001* 0.0001 -0.001*** -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.000) (0.000) (0.00) (0.00)
R’ship Length -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.004** -0.02***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.01) (0.003) (0.01) (0.001) (0.002)
Collateral × -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01 -0.0001 -0.02***
R’ship Length (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.01) (0.002) (0.003)
Land Prices × -0.02***
R’ship Length (0.002)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region-Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Bank-Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.07 0.08
Observations 107,649 107,649 107,649 107,649 99,014 7,634 56,601 56,601
Notes - The Table reports the results of annual panel OLS regression of corporate Investment ((Fixed Assetst+Depreciationt)/Turnovert−1) against
Collateral (Real-estate holding market value in 2002 * Land Prices in the company’s headquarter region in a given year), Relationship Length (1+log months
since relationship start in a given year) and other controls, unless otherwise specified. Short-Term Debt is the sum of short term loans and overdrafts over
Turnovert−1. Long-Term Debt is total debt liabilities due at balance-sheet year + 1 over Turnovert−1. The sample includes 2002-2013 yearly observations
for all UK companies with at least one banking relationship, are active in 2002, and report data for all the included controls - except firms in sectors specified
in Table 4. Controls included in all columns except column 1 but not reported are: the interaction of regional house prices with Firm Age, Profit Margin
and Total Assets as measured in 2002. Control definitions are reported in Table 2 notes. Standard errors clustered by region are reported in parentheses.
Stars indicate statistical significance at 1% (***), 5%(**), and 10%(*).
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Table 6: Corporate Relationships & the Collateral Channel: Additional interactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Baseline








Collateral 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
R’ship Length -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Collateral × -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02***
R’ship Length (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Collateral * X -0.004 -0.03*** -0.0001* -0.01*** 0.0003 0.003 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
R’ship Length * X 0.03*** -0.01*** 0.0002*** 0.008*** 0.0001 0.0003 0.003
(0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
Adjusted R2 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23
Observations 107,649 107,649 107,646 107,649 107,649 107,649 107,649 107,649
Notes - The Table reports the results of annual panel OLS regression of corporate Investment ((Fixed Assetst+Depreciationt)/Turnovert−1) against
Collateral (Real-estate holding market value in 2002 * Land Prices in the company’s headquarter region in a given year), Relationship Length (1+log
months since relationship start in a given year) and other controls. Firm Age is 1 for firms more than 10 years old, 0 otherwise; Small is 1 for firms
in the bottom 50% of the distribution of Total Assets in a given year, 0 otherwise; Credit Score is the firm’s Quiscore; Bank Size is the lag log(Total
Assets) of the firm’s bank; Bank Leverage is the lag ratio of total Tier 1 capital to total assets; Bank Losses is the lag ratio of net loan loss write-offs
(gross write-offs less recoveries) to total loans; Multiple Bank is 1 for firms with outstanding charges with more than one bank, 0 otherwise. The
sample includes 2002-2013 yearly observations for all UK companies with at least one banking relationship, are active in 2002, and report data for all
the included controls - except firms in sectors specified in Table 4. Controls included in all columns but not reported are: Cash Ratio, Profit Margin,
Firm Age, Credit Rating, as well the interaction of Land Prices with Firm Age, Profit Margin and Total Assets as measured in 2002. Other controls
definitions are reported in Table 2 notes. Standard errors clustered by region are reported in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance at 1%
(***), 5%(**), and 10%(*).
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Table 7: Corporate Relationships & the Collateral Channel: Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Baseline IV Collateral measure: Lag Rela-
tionship
Investment measure: Subset of Firms:













Collateral 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.01*** 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Collateral × -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.03*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*
R’ship Length (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.25 0.22 0.15 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.20
Observations 107,649 97,989 76,239 49,909 94,347 11,7967 10,7347 78,919 33,510 22,421
Notes - The Table reports the results of annual panel OLS regression of corporate Investment ((Fixed Assetst+Depreciationt)/Turnovert−1) against Collateral
(Real-estate holding market value in 2002 * Land Prices in the company’s headquarter region in a given year), Relationship Length (1+log months since relationship
start in a given year) and other controls, unless otherwise specified. The sample includes 2002-2013 yearly observations for all UK companies with at least one
banking relationship, are active in 2002, and report data for all the included controls - except firms in sectors specified in Table 4. Controls included in all columns
but not reported are: Cash Ratio, Profit Margin, Firm Age, Credit Rating, as well the interaction of Land Prices with Firm Age, Profit Margin and Total Assets
as measured in 2002. Control definitions are reported in Table 2 notes. Standard errors clustered by region are reported in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical
significance at 1% (***), 5%(**), and 10%(*).
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Table 8: Personal Relationships & the Collateral Channel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Included Firms: All Private Public All
Collateral 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.02) (0.003)
Collateral * R’ship Length -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02 -0.02∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.003)
Collateral * Director R’ship -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06)
R’ship Length * Director R’ship 0.001 -0.0000 0.001 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Collateral * R’ship Length * Director R’ship 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ -0.04 0.02∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.06) (0.006)
Collateral * Director R’ship * Shareholder 0.02
(0.013)
Length * Director R’ship * Shareholder 0.002
(0.002)
Collateral * Length * Director R’ship * Shareholder -0.01
(0.01)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.23
Observations 107,649 107,649 99,014 7,634 107,649
Notes - The Table reports the results of annual panel OLS regression of corporate Investment ((Fixed Assetst+Depreciationt)/Turnovert−1) against
Collateral (Real-estate holding market value in 2002 * Land Prices in the company’s headquarter region in a given year), Relationship Length (1+log
months since relationship start in a given year) and other controls, unless otherwise specified. Short-Term Debt is the sum of short term loans and
overdrafts over Turnovert−1. Long-Term Debt is total debt liabilities due at balance-sheet year + 1 over Turnovert−1. The sample includes 2002-2013
yearly observations for all UK companies with at least one banking relationship, are active in 2002, and report data for all the included controls - except
firms in sectors specified in Table 4. Controls included in all columns but not reported are: Cash Ratio, Profit Margin, Firm Age, Credit Rating, as well
the interaction of Land Prices with Firm Age, Profit Margin and Total Assets as measured in 2002. Control definitions are reported in Table 2 notes.
Standard errors clustered by region are reported in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance at 1% (***), 5%(**), and 10%(*).
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